RFC-5 — Blygger inside an organisation: one audience per origin, a boundary the publisher enforces
Request for comments · non-normative · OPEN FOR COMMENT until 2026-12-03 on blyg.blygger.org (#66); without a blyg, comment on blygger-spec#27 · session 59–60, 2026-11-04/05. Drafted by Opus 5.5 (session 59) at Venkat Rao's request as research only: no code, no client change. Edited and ruled by Fable 5.1 (session 60), whose rulings are section 10. Like a technical note, an RFC constrains nothing. When the comment period closes it becomes a technical note, for people building enterprise products on Blygger (decision #90: the close is the promotion, and the first build is a revision trigger). It is about the protocol and about what any client serving enterprise use has to handle. An enterprise product is expected to be a client of its own, so it describes no particular client. Written against protocol 0.4 at its tenth revision, which carries the sentences F1 and F5 add; no pre-1.0 version promises anything (#21).
Five questions in this RFC needed Fable under the four-question test (F1–F5). Section 6 states each item, with the test as it was applied, and section 10 rules it.
Summary
The protocol has no fundamental blocker for enterprise use. Nothing on the wire
assumes public DNS or the public internet. An origin is a URL string. Resolution and
verification are fetches. Every fetch failure already degrades safely: a poll failure
discards nothing (§12.3), and an unreachable source is a failed mention (§15.4). The
blyg: namespace URI is an opaque token that is never fetched (§7).
Three things need care, and only one of them is a missing capability:
- One audience per origin. A whole origin behind SSO or a private network works
today. Different readers seeing different items within one origin is L3, which #7
defers. Enterprises get audiences by running one origin per audience: the N-origins
group shape,
tn-3shape A. This is the missing capability (F1, F4). - References leak across a boundary. A quote bakes the bytes. Every reference
carries an origin string, and
citedcan carry an excerpt. A sent mention POSTs the internal URL to the outside receiver. The protocol permits all of this. An enterprise client has to refuse it at publish time (F3). - Retention law runs against two promises the medium makes: published documents answer 200 forever, and pins are irrevocable (F5).
Everything else is client work, and section 4 lists it: SSO and roles, reader credentials, egress policy, audit and retention, hosting and residency, AI controls, and the publish-time boundary.
1. The question
Venkat asked whether anything fundamental stops Blygger being used as an enterprise tool, deployed inside an organisation's boundary with the usual enterprise features: SSO, an internal DNS scope, private networks, audit, retention.
The answer matters beyond enterprises. The protocol's claim is that anything able to serve files can host a blyg (§1). An intranet file server can serve files. If the claim held only on the public internet, it would be narrower than it says.
plans/private-items-proposal.md §8 (same session) recorded Venkat's answer that
"enterprise deployments are under discussion" and are the concrete case likely to open
L3. This RFC is the enterprise half of that thread. It does not repeat the
private-items design. It asks what an enterprise needs before L3, and whether L3 is on
its critical path.
2. Deployment shapes
| Shape | What it is | Audience per origin | Protocol status |
|---|---|---|---|
| A. Fully internal | Every blyg sits on an internal DNS zone (for example under .internal, which ICANN reserved for private use in 2024) or behind a gateway. Nothing is reachable from outside. |
uniform (employees) | conformant today, given F1 |
| B. Internal plus selectively public | Some origins internal, some public: a public engineering blog next to internal team blygs. | uniform per origin; different origins, different audiences | conformant today; the boundary between origins is F3 |
| C. Mixed federation | Internal blygs subscribe to and quote public blygs, and the reverse is attempted. | as B | inbound (public → internal) is safe; outbound is F3 |
| D. Vendor multi-tenant hosting | A vendor hosts many organisations' blygs, each tenant one or more origins. | uniform per origin | conformant today: #14, #36, #61, #84 make N origins on one host safe |
| E. Per-item audiences in one origin | One team blyg where some items are for the team, some for the company, some public. | mixed | L3 (#7). Not available. |
Shapes A–D need no new protocol. Shape E is the only one that does, and the recommendation in section 3.3 is to build A–D first and treat E as the measured need that opens L3 (F4).
Shape B is "promotion" by publishing anew. Withdrawal is the only exit from public
(#8), and an origin's audience never changes (F1). So an internal item does not become
public. Its author publishes a new item in the public origin. Whether that new item may
name its internal ancestor is F3: forked_from or a quote would carry the internal
origin string outward.
3. Protocol analysis: is anything blocking?
Each claim below is checked against the 0.4 text, not assumed.
3.1 Nothing assumes public DNS
| Construct | What it needs | Internal origin? |
|---|---|---|
| Origin, identity origin (§2, §12.2, #14, #17) | an absolute base URL; identity is the final fetch URL minus its last segment | Fine. No rule requires a publicly resolvable name. §12.1 step 1 expects HTTPS; an internal CA is a transport matter. |
| Reference shape (§5.9) | {origin, id, version} as strings |
Fine as data. A reader outside cannot check staleness, which §12.3 already treats as an ordinary failure. |
content_html absolute URLs (§5.2, #53) |
every URL in the content absolute | Fine inside. A baked copy taken outside carries internal hostnames with it (section 3.2). |
Namespace URI https://blygger.org/ns/0.1 (§7) |
"an opaque wire token" | Fine. Never fetched, so an air-gapped reader needs no access to blygger.org. |
generator_url (§6.1) |
informative, MUST NOT gate | Fine. |
| Resolution (§12.1) | at most six fetches from the reader's network position | Fine for any reader that can reach the origin. |
| Verification (§15.4) | the receiver fetches the source from its asserted origin | Fine when the receiver can reach the source. Otherwise failed, which is honest (F2). |
| Webmention endpoint (§15.1) | optional at every level | Fine. A static internal blyg omits it (§15.7). |
| CORS (§4) | Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * is a SHOULD |
Fine. A gated origin answers credentialed CORS instead; the SHOULD bends for a stated reason. |
| Census (§3.2) | "the manifest is a file the protocol requires to be public" | Wording only. The census simply never sees internal blygs. "Public" here means the same bytes to every reader who can reach the origin (F1, ruled in section 10; §4 now says so). |
One hazard to rule out: split-horizon DNS for a blyg origin. If one name resolves to an internal server inside the network and a different server outside, then "the item at that origin" depends on where the reader stands. That breaks §12.2's guarantee that two readers given the same URL arrive at the same identity, and it reproduces per-reader content under one origin, which is shape E by the back door. Internal origins should use names that do not exist publicly. Section 8 lists this as a rejected design.
3.2 References across the boundary
Every cross-origin construct carries the target's origin string, and two of them carry words:
- A quote bakes bytes. §10.2 bakes the publisher's local snapshot into
content_html. §10.4 says the snapshot survives anything the source does, and §14 says so plainly ("anything published can be quoted into a thread whose snapshot its publisher cannot recall"). A quote of an internal item into a public blyg copies the internal text, and its internal absolute links (#53), out of the boundary for good. - A
citedobject (§5.9) may carry anexcerptand aurl, so even a barestub_oforforked_fromcan carry words. - Origin strings alone leak internal hostnames, mount paths and item ids. That is
true of
stub_of,forked_from,links[](§10.3a),transclusions[]andgenerated[].sources[](§5.7). - A sent mention leaks in the other direction. §15.2 says a publisher SHOULD send a
mention for every remote reference. From an internal blyg that quotes a public one, the
POST hands the public receiver the internal page URL as
source. The receiver then tries to fetch it: the fetch fails (good), but it has learned the hostname and the fact of the quote (bad). - Generation is a quote by model. A TK span drawing on an internal item, published
publicly, carries the internal origin in
generated[].sources[]and paraphrased content in the text. The 0.4 rationale for thesourcerelation, that "paraphrase by model must not be the one way to use a stranger's words without telling them", cuts the same way here.
None of this is a protocol defect. The protocol is a public-speech medium, and quoting is
its primitive (#12). It does mean that the boundary is enforced by the publisher at
publish time, or not at all. No reader-side or wire-side mechanism can recall a baked
quote. That is the same conclusion private-items-proposal.md §3.4 reached for private
items, generalised from "private versus public" to "narrower versus wider audience".
The rule a boundary-aware client applies:
A version published at an origin with audience W may carry no reference (of any kind,
citedincluded) to an origin whose audience is narrower than W, and sends no mention to a receiver outside the audience of its own origin.
The audiences are client configuration: a list of origin prefixes per audience. Both halves are within what the spec already permits. Refusing to quote is a publish error the client chooses. Not sending a mention is a SHOULD the client declines for a stated reason. The spec says nothing more (F3, ruled in section 10): §14 already carries the sentence that matters, "anything published can be quoted into a thread whose snapshot its publisher cannot recall", and the rule above is client guidance in this note.
3.3 "Readable only by members": static, L1/L2, or L3?
The distinction that settles this is where the audience boundary falls.
- Origin-uniform audience. The whole surface (manifest, feed, index, item documents, pins, media, pages) sits behind one gate: a private network, a VPN, an identity-aware proxy, Cloudflare Access. Everything inside the gate is plain static files, every reader who passes the gate sees the same bytes, and §4's 404/200 rules hold for every such reader. The gate is transport, like TLS. This is conformant at L1 and L2 and needs nothing new (F1, confirmed in section 10). §4 now says it in one sentence: "What an origin serves does not depend on who asks: every reader who can reach it gets the same bytes, and reachability is the deployment's."
- Per-item or per-reader audience in one origin. Two readers asking for the same
items/{id}.jsonget different answers (200 versus 401/404, or full versus redacted content). That is the gateprivate-items-proposal.md§5 analyses as C1–C3. Section 10 classifies them: C2 is refused, C3 is where an L3 round starts, and C1 is client territory under one invariant. The proposal's "not an option", a gated page over an open JSON, applies here too.
So an enterprise gets members-only reading today by running one origin per audience
behind a gate. A company-wide blyg, a team blyg and a public blyg are three origins, on
one host if it likes (tn-3 shape A). The cost is the one tn-3 names: N origins, N
archives, N sets of pins.
What this does not give is an item that is team-only today and company-wide tomorrow: the publish-anew path (section 2). That is where L3, or a studio-side cross-origin "promote" with honest lineage, would earn its cost. Section 10 rules it the trigger for L3 (F4), measured when a deployment hits that cost with a named case.
3.4 Reader side
- Readers must reach the origin. A subscribing studio behind the gate needs network reach and, when the gate is identity-aware, a machine credential (a service token, mTLS, workload identity) for each gated origin. That credential is transport. The protocol has no opinion on request headers, and §12.3's polling rules are unchanged. It is client work (section 4.2).
- Failures are already safe. A reader that loses access keeps its stored state and backs off (§12.3). It never treats 401 as withdrawal, because only an endcap is withdrawal (§13.4).
- Sanitize-at-render is unchanged (§14). The internal-content risk is egress, not rendering.
- Retention follows the origin (§13.4). A records system that keeps withdrawn content because the law requires it acts outside the protocol, and keeps the archive off every surface the spec governs (F5, ruled in section 10). §14 now says: "Law may compel a publisher to remove what it promised to serve, or a reader to retain what an origin withdrew. Both are acts outside the protocol: a compelled removal is a 404 with no marker, and a compelled retention never reaches any surface this document governs."
3.5 Identity and SSO
Invariant 4 and #11 say that identity is never in the protocol, and that the only authenticated entity is the origin. This helps enterprise use rather than blocking it. The protocol takes no position on how an owner, an editor or a reader proves who they are, so SSO is entirely the client's:
- Write side. §14's last bullet and §16.6 put authoring auth out of scope, and #31 rules out a normative write surface. A client's authoring auth is its own; an IdP session can be its root credential. The pattern #31 recommends (scoped, owner-revocable tokens for tools, a root credential no tool holds) carries over unchanged.
- Bylines. An SSO-backed studio can assert verified employee bylines (
author.name,author.urlpointing to an internal directory profile). #35'srel="me"proof works inside the network exactly as outside. RFC-1'sidsand address book apply unchanged. Bylines are still the origin's claim (§5.5), which inside one organisation is the right trust model. - Multi-author. The invariant is single publisher per origin, not single author
(#11). A team blyg with many SSO users is
tn-3shape B, the masthead. #36's test, "who can withdraw", decides between shape A and shape B per team. - Reader identity. This is where SSO touches the protocol, and only in shape E, where a group needs named readers. That is F4, and #11 calls it out ("keys imply identity").
3.6 Verdict
| Item | Kind | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Public DNS or internet assumed anywhere | none found | 3.1 |
| Whole-origin gating (SSO proxy, private network) | interpretation; one §4 sentence | F1, ruled, §10 |
| Verification when the source is unreachable | interpretation, small | F2, ruled, §10 |
| Cross-boundary quoting and reference leakage | client rule, no spec text | F3, ruled, §10 |
| Per-item audiences in one origin | missing capability (L3) | F4, ruled, §10 |
| Compelled deletion; compliance archives of others' content | out of protocol; one §14 sentence | F5, ruled, §10 |
| SSO, roles, audit, residency, egress, AI controls, DLP | client and product work | 4 |
4. Concerns for clients serving enterprise use
The protocol governs only the published surface (#3). Everything below is the client's business. It is listed so that implementers see the whole job, and so that two enterprise clients can make compatible choices where they touch.
4.1 Authoring identity: SSO and roles
- The organisation's IdP (OIDC, or SAML through a broker) is the root credential. No tool holds it; tools get scoped, revocable tokens (the pattern of #31).
- Many people may author in one origin. The protocol needs one publisher per origin,
not one author (#11), so a team blyg is
tn-3shape B with bylines, or shape A with one origin per member. #36's test, "who can withdraw", decides between them. - IdP groups map onto the client's roles. Deprovisioning (SCIM or equivalent) revokes a departing user's sessions and tokens.
- Verified bylines:
author.urlcan point at the internal directory profile, and #35'srel="me"proof works inside the network as outside.
4.2 Reading gated origins
- Gate the whole surface (manifest, feed, index, item documents, pins, media, pages) with one gate, so that every reader past it gets the same bytes (F1). Gating only the HTML leaves the full text in the JSON.
- A subscribing client needs a machine credential per gated origin (service token, mTLS, workload identity). Attach it only on an exact origin-prefix match, and never follow a redirect with it to another origin: §12.2 allows cross-host redirects, and a credential that follows one leaks.
- Caches must be keyed so that nothing cached for one audience is served to another.
4.3 Network reach and egress
- Internal names. A client fetches manifests, feeds and documents (§12), and a receiver fetches mention sources (§15.4). Inside the network those names often exist only in internal DNS, and a resolver that consults public DNS will not find them.
- The probe risk. §14 asks receivers to refuse private-network addresses where they could be used to probe them. The Webmention endpoint is the dangerous one: anyone who can POST to it chooses a URL for the receiver to fetch. An internal deployment needs an allowlist (host suffixes or origins, plus address ranges), not a switch that turns the check off, and the endpoint should fetch allowlisted sources only for claims that arrived from inside (F2).
- Air gaps. In an air-gapped deployment, no feature may reach a public host: CDN scripts, update checks, embeds, hosted AI providers.
- Rebinding. A resolve-then-fetch check does not pin the connection. Enforce egress at the network boundary as well.
4.4 Audit, retention and legal hold
- Audit. An append-only, exportable log of sign-ins, token grants and revocations, publish, withdraw and pin, visibility and settings changes, subscriptions, outbound mentions, and AI calls (model and provider; not prompt text by default).
- Legal hold mostly comes free on the published side: withdraw-not-delete (#8) keeps every published version, and pins keep their bytes. The gaps are unpublished material (drafts, private items, media), which a hold must turn from deletes into soft deletes.
- Retention schedules and compelled deletion run the other way. A records policy, a court order or an erasure request can require removing a published item that §4 promised would answer 200 forever and a pin promised to keep (§8). The removal is an act outside the protocol: the document answers 404, with no status code, marker or reason (F5, ruled in section 10; the §14 sentence is quoted in section 3.4).
- Archives of external content. Keeping other origins' withdrawn content because the law requires it is outside the protocol too. A client that is both reader and archive keeps the archive off every surface the spec governs: no presentation, no re-serving, no quote from it (§13.4, F5).
4.5 Hosting and data residency
The protocol is host-neutral: any server that can serve the files conforms (§4), so the published surface can sit on an internal file server behind any gate. It loses only the Webmention endpoint, which is optional (§15.7). Where the authoring side runs, and where its data lives, is the client's design. Residency is a property of that design and of its hosts.
4.6 AI provider controls
AI is never in the protocol (#5). An enterprise client needs:
- an operator-controlled list of allowed models and providers, with no free-entry way around it;
- the ability to point at an internal gateway;
- AI calls inside the egress policy;
- the boundary rule (section 3.2) applied to generation sources, since a TK source from a narrower audience is a cross-boundary reference.
4.7 The publish-time boundary (DLP)
This is F3, and the most important enterprise control. Section 10 rules that it is client policy with no spec text: declining a SHOULD for a stated reason is what SHOULD means, and §14 already warns that anything published can be quoted out of its publisher's reach. Revisit only if two boundary-building clients disagree.
- Audiences are configuration: named sets of origin prefixes.
- Publish block. A version may carry no reference (transclusions,
stub_of,forked_from,links[],generated[].sources[],cited) to an origin narrower than its own. Say which references block, and offer to remove them. This is the same blockplans/private-items-proposal.md§3.4 describes for private items, keyed on audience. - Mentions. Send none to a receiver outside the origin's own audience, and show the author why the §15.2 SHOULD was declined.
- Content scan. Optionally, check
content_htmlfor absolute URLs under narrower origins (#53 makes them easy to find): a plain link leaks a hostname. - Egress as backstop. A wider-audience deployment that cannot fetch a narrower origin cannot quote it either.
4.8 Multi-tenant hosting
N origins on one host are safe on the wire: #61 stops one tenant's documents verifying in another's name, #84 makes target membership exact, and #87 fixes the manifest name at every identity. Each tenant is the publisher of its origins (#11), not the vendor. Isolation of data, egress policy, audit and IdP per tenant is the vendor's design.
5. Wire impact
None. F1 and F5 are each one sentence in the living 0.4 text that readers already handle; F2 and F3 add nothing; F4's shape E stays L3. Shapes A–D use only existing constructs, and the boundary rule is a client publish error and a declined SHOULD.
6. The five items and their tests
The four questions are those in CLAUDE.md → Model routing: (1) readers must change;
(2) reader-visible addition; (3) narrows, widens or reinterprets a locked decision;
(4) a locked decision already settles it. The items are kept as the record of the test
as the draft applied it; each Proposal now opens with the ruling.
F1. Audience is a property of the origin.
- Proposal: Ruled, section 10: confirmed, with one sentence in §4. The draft: the spec governs the bytes an origin serves to whoever can reach it. Reachability, including an identity-aware gate across the whole surface, is deployment. A gated origin conforms at L1 and L2, provided that every reader who passes the gate gets the same bytes. Per-reader difference within an origin stays L3. §3.2's "required to be public" reads as "served to its audience". A blyg origin MUST NOT be split-horizon.
- Test: Q1 no. Q2 no. Q3 yes: it reads #1 and #7 ("privileged-group access is deferred to L3") as being about per-item audiences, not whole-origin ones, and that is an interpretation Opus should not make alone. Q4: #3 and #14 point the same way, but do not settle it.
- Touches: #1, #3, #7, #14, #17; §3, §3.2, §4 (200 forever, CORS), §12.2, §16.7.
F2. Verification across a network boundary.
- Proposal: Ruled, section 10: confirmed, no text. The draft: a mention whose source the receiver cannot fetch is failed, with no new state. §14's "refusal to fetch private-network addresses where the deployment could be used to probe them" is met by a deployment-scoped allowlist, because internal fetches that the deployment intends are not probes.
- Test: Q1 no. Q2 no. Q3 maybe: it reads §14's private-network SHOULD as configurable. Q4: #28 and #61 settle the mechanics, but not §14's wording. Small.
- Touches: #13, #28, #61, #84; §14, §15.2, §15.4.
F3. References that cross a boundary.
- Proposal: Ruled, section 10: confirmed as client policy, no text. The draft: client policy in this RFC (section 3.2's rule), with no spec text yet. Revisit only if a second client builds a boundary and the two disagree.
- Test: Q1 no and Q2 no while it stays client policy. Q3 maybe: declining §15.2's SHOULD wholesale for a class of receivers, and a publish error the spec does not list in §10.2 step 3. Q4: #3 lets the client refuse anything at publish. If Fable wants a sentence in §14 ("a quote is an export"), that is spec text.
- Touches: #9, #12, #26, #53; §5.6, §5.7, §5.9
cited, §10.2, §10.3a, §14, §15.2;private-items-proposal.md§3.4.
F4. Group visibility is L3, and is enterprise its trigger?
- Proposal: Ruled, section 10: confirmed, with C1–C3 classified. The draft: enterprise
does not need L3 to start (section 3.3). Shape E is the trigger,
measured when a deployment hits the publish-anew cost in practice. Until then, group
tokens wait, as
private-items-proposal.md§8.3 says. - Test: any form of shape E is Q1, Q2 and Q3 yes (C2), or Q3 yes (C1).
- Touches: #1, #7, #11, #35, #43; §3, §4, §16.7;
private-items-proposal.md§5, §8.3; backlog L3 row.
F5. Compelled removal and compliance retention.
- Proposal: Ruled, section 10: a sentence in §14, no marker. The draft: say in §14 that a legally compelled removal is an out-of-protocol act. The origin breaks a promise and readers see a 404, which §12.3 already tolerates. Add no status code or marker. For the reader side, ask whether a non-presenting compliance archive is "hoarding" under §13.4.
- Test: a §14 sentence is Q1 no, Q2 no, Q3 yes (it qualifies #8's "200 forever" and the irrevocable pin). A marker such as 410 with a reason would be Q1 and Q2 yes.
- Touches: #8; §4, §8, §9, §13.4, §14.
7. Open questions for comment
For implementers building enterprise products on Blygger. F1–F5 are ruled (section 10); these questions are about what implementers need, and where an answer bears on a ruling it says which.
- Is one origin per audience enough? Name the case where publishing anew across audiences fails you. That case is what opens L3 (F4).
- Reader credentials. How should a subscribing client authenticate to a gated origin: service tokens, mTLS, workload identity, something else? Is a shared convention worth an RFC, or is it each product's business?
- Outbound mentions from inside. Should an internal blyg ever notify a public one that it quoted it? If so, under what explicit act?
- Promotion. When an internal item is republished publicly, should the public item name its internal ancestor (leaking the origin), carry a public lineage note, or carry nothing?
- Retention. Which do you need: compelled deletion of published items, legal hold over drafts, a compliance archive of external content, or all three? Does the §14 sentence (F5) cover what you need to build, and if not, what else do you need — legal hold on drafts, archives, something the sentence does not reach?
- Hosting. Where must the authoring side run, and what residency do your buyers need?
- Audit. Which events, which format, which sink?
- Teams. For your users, is a team blyg shape A (members' own origins) or shape B (one masthead)? Who withdraws?
- Should the boundary rule (section 3.2) ever become spec text? It is client policy today (F3); name the disagreement between two clients that would change that.
8. Rejected designs
Recorded because each will be proposed.
- Split-horizon blyg origins. One name, two servers, two contents. This breaks §12.2's determinism and is per-reader content under one origin (section 3.1).
- Gating the HTML pages only. The JSON carries the full text (private-items proposal §5, "not an option").
- A 401 or 403 on chosen item documents within an otherwise readable origin. This is C2. §4 has no third answer, and §15.4 cannot verify against it. It is L3.
- Turning private-network refusal off wholesale for an internal deployment. It works, and it makes the Webmention endpoint an internal fetch proxy for anyone who can reach it. Use an allowlist (section 4.3).
- An enterprise "audience" member in the manifest or item documents. Readers cannot act on it without identity, which is #11's line. Audience is the client's configuration plus the gate.
- A removal marker (a 410 with a reason, a tombstone). A removal marker is the tombstone #8 refused, and a delete signal invites delete requests. A compelled removal is a 404 with no marker, which readers already tolerate (§12.3; F5, section 10).
9. Relation to other documents
plans/private-items-proposal.md: the owner-only level and its publish block. This RFC generalises that block to audiences (section 4.7) and supplies F4's trigger framing for its §8.3.docs/notes/tn-3-groups-and-aggregation.md: shapes A and B are the enterprise team shapes.docs/notes/tn-6-mentions-and-identifier-schemes.md(formerly RFC-1): bylines,idsand agent members under SSO (section 3.5).docs/notes/tn-7-comments-sections.md(formerly RFC-2): hosted commenters, which inside an organisation are SSO users commenting through the house's comments origin.
10. Rulings (Fable 5.1, session 60, 2026-11-05)
The draft closed with five items for Fable. The rulings follow, each with the principle it rests on. All five confirm the draft's direction; F4 adds a classification the draft did not make, and F5 settles the reader side the draft left as a question.
F1. Audience is a property of the origin — confirmed, with spec text. Decision #1 makes the protocol a static file contract, and #14 makes an origin any absolute URL; nothing in the text requires that an origin be publicly reachable. "Public" in #7 and in §3.2 means the same bytes to every reader who can reach the origin. Reachability is deployment, like TLS. Per-reader difference within one origin is L3 (#7), and a split-horizon origin is that difference by the back door, because it breaks §12.2's determinism. The tenth revision of 0.4 adds the sentence to §4: "What an origin serves does not depend on who asks: every reader who can reach it gets the same bytes, and reachability is the deployment's."
F2. Verification across a network boundary — confirmed, no text. §14's clause is already conditional: it asks for refusal "where the deployment could be used to probe them". A fetch the deployment intends, under an allowlist, is not a probe. A source the receiver cannot reach is failed (§15.4), which is honest: the receiver could not verify it.
F3. References that cross a boundary — confirmed as client policy, no text. §14
already says the sentence the draft wanted: "anything published can be quoted into a
thread whose snapshot its publisher cannot recall". The boundary rule (section 3.2: no
reference of any kind, cited included, to a narrower origin; no mention to a receiver
outside the origin's audience) lives in this note as client guidance. Declining a SHOULD
for a stated reason is what SHOULD means, so a client that withholds §15.2's mentions
across the boundary conforms. Revisit only if two boundary-building clients disagree.
F4. Group visibility is L3 — confirmed, and the three shapes classified. Enterprise does not need L3 to start. Shape E is the trigger, measured when a deployment has hit the publish-anew cost with a named case. Of the private-items proposal's three gate shapes:
- C2 (a 401 or 403 on chosen documents, under any gate descriptor) is refused. It is not static, and it is L3 by the back door.
- C3 (encrypted static content) is the shape the L3 round starts from when the trigger fires.
- C1 (a redacted wire, with a fuller rendition served off the mount to signed-in readers) is client territory under #3, not L3, under one invariant: nothing on the protocol surface may name, link to or depend on the fuller rendition, and the public document is complete in itself. The redaction is the author's own visible edit (#78). That is a paywalled newsletter beside a blyg, which the protocol has never forbidden.
F5. Compelled removal and compliance retention — a sentence in §14, no marker. "200 forever" and the irrevocable pin are the publisher's promises. Law may force the publisher to break them, and the protocol does not legislate the law. Readers already tolerate a 404 (§12.3). There is no status code and no reason: a removal marker is the tombstone #8 refused, and a delete signal invites delete requests (section 8, item 6). On the reader side, §13.4 governs what a conformant reader presents and re-serves. A records system that retains under law is outside the protocol in the same way, and a client that is both reader and archive keeps the archive off every surface the spec governs. The tenth revision of 0.4 adds to §14: "Law may compel a publisher to remove what it promised to serve, or a reader to retain what an origin withdrew. Both are acts outside the protocol: a compelled removal is a 404 with no marker, and a compelled retention never reaches any surface this document governs."
What happens next. Published for comment under #66 on 2026-11-05; the period closes
on 2026-12-03 (four weeks). Decision #93 records the five rulings, with this section as
their reasoning (v0.4-plan.md §18). Comments are stubs on the item, and
counter-proposals are forks of the pin.
Source: docs/rfcs/rfc-5-enterprise-deployment.md in blygger-spec, which is where revisions are made; each one is published here as a new version. To comment, respond to this item from your own blyg: a stub is a comment, a partial quote names the passage, and a fork of the pinned version is a counter-proposal.
v1 · pinned: v1
“RFC-5 open for comment until 2026-12-03.”
Venkatesh Rao